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Abstract
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover
Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special
classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces,
such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite pro-
gramming. In general, however, continuous games are not di-
rectly amenable to computational procedures. In this contri-
bution, we develop an iterative strategy generation technique
for finding a Nash equilibrium in a whole class of continu-
ous two-person zero-sum games with compact strategy sets.
The procedure, which is called the double oracle algorithm,
has been successfully applied to large finite games in the past.
We prove the convergence of the double oracle algorithm to
a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the algorithm is guaranteed
to recover an approximate equilibrium in finitely-many steps.
Our numerical experiments show that it outperforms fictitious
play on several examples of games appearing in the literature.
In particular, we provide a detailed analysis of experiments
with a version of the continuous Colonel Blotto game.
1 Introduction
Action spaces of games appearing in AI applications are
often prohibitively large. Consequently, one has to strive
for efficiently computable approximations of equilibria, pos-
sibly with provable bounds on convergence rates (Gilpin,
Pen˜a, and Sandholm 2012). A number of algorithms ap-
plied in AI like fictitious play (Brown 1951), the double
oracle algorithm (McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003) or
the policy-space response oracle (Lanctot et al. 2017; Muller
et al. 2019) overcome the problem with the cardinality by
selecting ‘good’ strategies iteratively. The selection process
is usually based on an approximation of the best response.
In a nutshell, the recent advances in algorithmic game theory
has led to the development of algorithms for (approximately)
solving extremely large finite games, such as variants of
poker (Moravcˇı´k et al. 2017; Brown and Sandholm 2019) or
multidimensional resource allocation problems (Behnezhad
et al. 2017).
Completely new problems arise from considering games
with infinite strategy spaces, in which the strategies are vec-
tors of real numbers corresponding to physical parameters
(Archibald and Shoham 2009) or to the setting of classifiers
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(Yasodharan and Loiseau 2019). The first theoretical obsta-
cle is that the existence of mixed strategy equilibria is guar-
anteed only for infinite games whose utility functions satisfy
additional conditions (Glicksberg 1952; Fan 1952). On top
of that, some well understood classes of infinite games pos-
sess only optimal strategies whose supports are uncountable;
see (Roberson 2006) for an in-depth discussion of infinite
Colonel Blotto games.
Computational procedures for finding (approximate)
equilibria of infinite games exist for rather special kinds of
utility functions. Two-person zero-sum polynomial games
are solvable by semidefinite programming; see (Parrilo
2006; Laraki and Lasserre 2012). Approximate equilibria of
separable games can be computed under additional assump-
tions (Stein, Ozdaglar, and Parrilo 2008). However, games
appearing in applications are rarely of the form above and
a detailed analysis of their properties is inevitable; see (Ya-
sodharan and Loiseau 2019) for an application in adversar-
ial machine learning. Some authors develop approximations
of best response by neural nets (Kamra et al. 2018, 2019).
One of the important iterative procedures for finite games,
Brown-Robinson learning process known as fictitious play
(Brown 1951; Robinson 1951), has been recently applied to
infinite games (Ganzfried 2020). However, the dynamics of
best response strategies generated by fictitious play was an-
alyzed only in special cases;cf. (Hofbauer and Sorin 2006;
Perkins and Leslie 2014). To the best of our knowledge, not
much is known about the convergence of fictitious play for
general zero-sum continuous games as defined below.
This paper deals with continuous games, which we de-
fine as two-person zero-sum games with continuous utility
functions over compact strategy sets. We extend the dou-
ble oracle algorithm (McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003)
to such games. This algorithm is an iterative strategy gener-
ation technique based on (i) the solution of subgames by LP
solvers and (ii) the expansion of subgames’ strategy sets us-
ing the best response strategies obtained thus far. Our main
result is the convergence of this algorithm for any contin-
uous game (Theorem 3.1). The numerical experiments in
Section 4 show that the double oracle algorithm converges
faster than fictitious play on several examples (polynomial
game, Townsend function, and a version of the Colonel
Blotto game). The repository with our experiments’ codes
is https://github.com/sadda/Double Oracle.
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2 Basic Notions
This section summarizes basic notions and results related to
continuous zero-sum games and their equilibria; see (Karlin
1959) or (Stein, Ozdaglar, and Parrilo 2008) for details.
Continuous Games
Player 1 and Player 2 select strategies from nonempty com-
pact sets X ⊆ Rm and Y ⊆ Rn, respectively. The utility
function of Player 1 is a continuous function u : X×Y → R.
The utility function of Player 2 is −u. The triple G =
(X,Y, u) is called a continuous game. Note that some au-
thors use the term ‘continuous game’ in a somewhat dif-
ferent sense allowing utility functions to be discontinuous
functions over metric spaces of strategies.
A continuous game G = (X,Y, u) is (i) finite if both X
and Y are finite, and (ii) infinite ifX or Y is infinite. We will
need the notion of subgame. When X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y
are nonempty compact sets, we define the subgame G′ =
(X ′, Y ′, u) of G by the restriction of u to X ′ × Y ′, which is
denoted by the same letter.
The concept of mixed strategy in continuous games
should allow every player to randomize with respect to any
probability measure on the corresponding strategy set. We
will spell out the definitions related to mixed strategies only
for Player 1. Their counterparts for Player 2 are completely
analogous. A mixed strategy of Player 1 is a Borel proba-
bility measure p over X . The set of all mixed strategies of
Player 1 is denoted by ∆X . The support of a mixed strategy
p ∈ ∆X is the set
spt p :=
⋂
{K ⊆ X | K compact, p(K) = 1}.
Every mixed strategy p ∈ ∆X can be classified as one of the
following types depending on the size of its support.
1. Pure strategy p. This means that spt p = {x} for some
x ∈ X . Equivalently, p is equal to Dirac measure δx.
2. Finitely-supported mixed strategy p. The support spt p is
finite. Hence, p can be written as a convex combination
p =
∑
x∈spt p
p(x) · δx.
3. Mixed strategy p with infinite support spt p.
Put ∆ := ∆X ×∆Y . If players implement a mixed strat-
egy profile (p, q) ∈ ∆, the expected utility of Player 1 is
U(p, q) := ∫
X×Y
u(x, y) d(p× q). (1)
This yields a function U : ∆→ R, which can be effectively
evaluated in important special cases. For example, when
both spt p and spt q are finite,
U(p, q) =
∑
x∈spt p
∑
y∈spt q
p(x) · q(x) · u(x, y).
If Player 1 employs a pure strategy given by x ∈ X and
Player 2 uses a mixed strategy q ∈ ∆Y , we will use the
short notation U(x, q) := U(δx, q).
Equlibria in Continuous Games
A mixed strategy profile (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆ is an equilibrium in
a continuous game G if
U(p, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q) (2)
holds for all (p, q) ∈ ∆. By Glicksberg’s theorem (Glicks-
berg 1952), every continuous game has an equilibrium. De-
fine the lower/upper value of G by
v(G) := max
p∈∆X
min
q∈∆Y
U(p, q) and
v(G) := min
q∈∆Y
max
p∈∆X
U(p, q).
Proposition 2.1 gives several conditions for equilibrium,
which will be used throughout the paper without further ref-
erences. Its proof is omitted since it is completely analogous
to the case of finite games.
Proposition 2.1. Let G = (X,Y, u) be a continuous game
and (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆. The following assertions are equivalent.
1. The strategy profile (p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium.
2. U(x, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, y) for all (x, y) ∈ X×Y .
3. min
y∈Y
U(p∗, y) = v(G) and max
x∈X
U(x, q∗) = v(G).
4. v(G) = U(p∗, q∗) = v(G).
Hence, the equality v(G) = v(G) holds for every continuous
game G, and v(G) := v(G) is called the value of G.
Bounds on the size of supports of equilibrium strategies
are known only for particular classes of continuous games,
such as the class of separable games (Stein, Ozdaglar, and
Parrilo 2008). There are examples of games whose equilib-
ria are almost any sets of finitely-supported mixed strategies
(Rehbeck 2018). Moreover, some continuous games possess
only equilibria with uncountable supports (Roberson 2006).
In many applications it is enough to find an -equilibrium
(p∗, q∗) for some  ≥ 0, that is,
U(p, q∗)−  ≤ U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q) +  (3)
for all (p, q) ∈ ∆. Note that this is a natural extension of (2).
According to Proposition 2.2, whose proof is in Appendix B,
we can always recover an approximate equilibrium (p∗, q∗)
with finite supports and such that U(p∗, q∗) is arbitrarily
close to the value of game v(G).
Proposition 2.2. Let G be an arbitratry continuous game.
Then for every  > 0:
• There exists an -equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of G such that both
spt p∗ and spt q∗ are finite.
• Every -equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of G satisfies the inequality
|U(p∗, q∗)− v(G)| ≤ .
3 Double Oracle Algorithm
The double oracle algorithm uses the notion of best response
strategies. For every mixed strategy q ∈ ∆Y of Player 2,
the best response set of Player 1 is
β1(q) :=
{
x ∈ X | U(x, q) = max
x′∈X
U(x′, q)
}
.
Analogously, for any p ∈ ∆X , put
β2(p) :=
{
y ∈ Y | U(p, y) = min
y′∈Y
U(p, y′)
}
.
Note that best response strategies are defined to be pure,
without any loss of generality; see Proposition A.2. More-
over, by compactness and continuity, β1(q) and β2(p) are
always nonempty compact sets.
The idea of the double oracle algorithm (Algorithm 3.1)
applied to a continuous game G = (X,Y, u) is simple.
In every iteration, finite strategy sets Xi and Yi are deter-
mined and some equilibrium (p∗i , q
∗
i ) of the finite subgame
(Xi, Yi, u) is found by the standard linear programming
methods. The best responses xi+1 and yi+1 to q∗i and p
∗
i , re-
spectively, are recovered, and added to the strategy sets. This
is repeated until a terminating condition is satisfied. The re-
sulting strategy profile is guaranteed to be an -equilibrium.
Algorithm 3.1 Double Oracle Algorithm
Input: Continuous game G = (X,Y, u), nonempty finite
subsets X1 ⊆ X , Y1 ⊆ Y , and  ≥ 0
1: Let i := 0
2: repeat
3: Increase i by one
4: Find an equilibrium (p∗i , q
∗
i ) of subgame (Xi, Yi, u)
5: Find some xi+1 ∈ β1(q∗i ) and yi+1 ∈ β2(p∗i )
6: Let Xi+1 := Xi ∪ {xi+1} and Yi+1 := Yi ∪ {yi+1}
7: Let vi := U(p
∗
i , yi+1) and vi := U(xi+1, q
∗
i )
8: until vi − vi ≤ 
Output: -equilibrium (p∗i , q∗i ) of game G
We now perform a simple analysis of the algorithm. Since
U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) = max
x∈Xi
U(x, q∗i ) ≤ max
x∈X
U(x, q∗i ) = vi
and similarly for the lower bound, we have
vi ≤ U(p∗i , q∗i ) ≤ vi. (4)
Lemma B.2 states that the same bounds hold even for the
value of game G:
vi ≤ v(G) ≤ vi.
The usual stopping condition of the double oracle algorithm
for finite games is Xi+1 = Xi and Yi+1 = Yi. Herein we
chose the terminating condition vi−vi ≤  for two reasons:
• It is more general. Indeed, Lemma B.1 states that if
Xi+1 = Xi and Yi+1 = Yi, then vi − vi = 0.
• It provides an estimate for the quality of approximate
equilibrium. Formula (4) implies vi − vi ≥ 0 and The-
orem 3.1 states that (p∗i , q
∗
i ) is an (vi − vi)-equilibrium.
Then Proposition 2.2 guarantees that v(G) is known pre-
cisely up to (vi − vi).
The main result of this manuscript is the convergence of
the double oracle algorithm. In fact our result generalizes
the result about convergence of the double oracle algorithm
for finite games; see (McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003).
For finite games, we neglect the case of  > 0 since the
algorithm is known to converge to an equilibrium for  = 0
in finitely many steps.
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (X,Y, u) be a continuous game.
1. If G is a finite game and  = 0, Algorithm 3.1 converges
to an equilibrium in a finite number of iterations.
2. If G is an infinite game and  = 0, every weakly conver-
gent subsequence of Algorithm 3.1 converges to an equi-
librium in a possibly infinite number of iterations. More-
over, such a weakly convergent subsequence always exist.
3. If G is an infinite game and  > 0, Algorithm 3.1 con-
verges to a finitely supported -equilibrium in a finite
number of iterations.
Proof. We first realize that the terminating condition
U(xi+1, q
∗
i )− U(p∗i , yi+1) ≤ 
implies
U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) ≤ U(xi+1, q∗i ) ≤ U(p∗i , yi+1) + 
= min
y′∈Y
U(p∗i , y
′) +  = min
q∈∆Y
U(p∗i , q) + .
The first and the third relation above follow from the defi-
nition of the best response, the second from the terminating
condition and the last from Proposition A.2. Similarly, we
can show that
U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) ≥ U(p∗i , yi+1) ≥ U(xi+1, q∗i )− 
= max
x′∈X
U(x′, q∗i )−  = max
p∈∆X
U(p, q∗i )− .
Combining these two inequalities implies that (p∗i , q
∗
i ) is
an -equilibrium. Note that for  = 0, this means that
(p∗i , q
∗
i ) is an equilibrium.
Item 1. If G is finite, then after a finite number of iterations
it must happen that Xi+1 = Xi and Yi+1 = Yi. Lemma B.1
implies that the terminating condition of Algorithm 3.1 is
satisfied with  = 0 and the first paragraph of this proof
implies that (p∗i , q
∗
i ) is an equilibrium of G.
Item 2. Consider now the case of an infinite game and
 = 0. If the double oracle algorithm terminates in a finite
number of iterations, then the first paragraph implies that
(p∗i , q
∗
i ) is an equilibrium. In the opposite case, the algorithm
produces an infinite number of iterations. Due to Proposi-
tion A.1, there is a weakly convergent subsequence which,
for simplicity, will be denoted by the same indices. There-
fore, p∗i ⇒ p∗ for some p∗ and q∗i ⇒ q∗ for some q∗, where
the symbol⇒ denotes the weak convergence (Appendix A).
Consider any y such that y ∈ Yi0 for some i0. Take an ar-
bitrary i ≥ i0, which implies y ∈ Yi. Since (p∗i , q∗i ) is
an equilibrium of the subgame (Xi, Yi, u), we get
U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) ≤ U(p∗i , y)→ U(p∗, y),
where the convergence follows from (11). Since
U(p∗i , q
∗
i )→ U(p∗, q∗) due to (10), this implies
U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, y) (5)
for all y ∈ ∪Yi. Since U is continuous, the previous inequal-
ity holds for all y ∈ cl(∪Yi).
Fix now an arbitrary y ∈ Y . Because yi+1 is the best
response, we get
U(p∗i , yi+1) ≤ U(p∗i , y)→ U(p∗, y), (6)
where the limit holds due to (11). Since yi+1 ∈ Yi+1 and by
compactness of Y , we can select a convergent subsequence
yi → yˆ, again without any relabelling, where yˆ ∈ cl(∪Yi).
This allows us to use (5) to obtain
U(p∗i , yi+1)→ U(p∗, yˆ) ≥ U(p∗, q∗). (7)
Combining (6) and (7) yields
U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, y)
for all y ∈ Y . Repeating the analogous arguments in the
other variable yields
U(x, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, y)
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Then Proposition 2.1 says that
(p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium of G.
Item 3. Consider now the case of an infinite game with
 > 0 and realize that (6) and (7) also imply
U(p∗, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, yˆ)← U(p∗i , yi+1)
≤ U(p∗i , q∗i )→ U(p∗, q∗),
which means U(p∗i , yi+1) → U(p∗, q∗). Similarly,
U(xi+1, q
∗
i )→ U(p∗, q∗) and therefore
vi − vi = U(xi+1, q∗i )− U(p∗i , yi+1)→ 0.
This states that the terminating condition will be satisfied
after a finite number of iterations and the first paragraph of
this proof states that (p∗i , q
∗
i ) is an -equilibrium. Since only
a finite number of iterations was performed and since X1
and X2 are finite, this implies that the supports of p∗i and q
∗
i
are finite as well.
Since best response strategies are not unique, in general,
the sequence generated by Algorithm 3.1 may fail to con-
verge for some continuous games. Hence, it is necessary
to consider a convergent subsequence of iterates in Theo-
rem 3.1. Such a continuous game is shown in Example B.1.
Another feature of the double oracle algorithm is that the se-
quence vi−vi has nonnegative terms and converges to zero,
but it is not necessarily monotone. This behavior can be
demonstrated even for some finite games.
4 Numerical Experiments
We present two classes of games. The first class con-
tains one-dimensional strategy spaces and the second class
consists of certain Colonel Blotto games. The equilib-
rium of each finite subgame is found by solving a lin-
ear program. The best responses were computed by select-
ing the best point of a uniform discretization for the one-
dimensional problems and by using a mixed-integer linear
programming reformulation for the Colonel Blotto games.
The examples were implemented in Python with solvers
scipy.optimize and mip. All computations were per-
formed on a laptop with Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM
and no GPU was involved. Randomness is present only in
the initialization of one-dimensional examples when a ran-
dom pair of pure strategies is found.
We compare the double oracle algorithm with fictitious
play. Its extension from finite to infinite games was recently
formulated in (Ganzfried 2020).
One-dimensional Examples
We consider a polynomial game G1 from (Parrilo 2006) with
the strategy spacesX = Y = [−1, 1] and the utility function
u1(x, y) = 5xy − 2x2 − 2xy2 − y.
In the equilibrium, Player 1 has the pure strategy x∗ = 0.2
and Player 2 has the mixed strategy q∗ = 0.78δ1 + 0.22δ−1.
The value of game is−0.48. Figure 1 shows the convergence
of upper/lower estimates of the value of game. Note that the
fictitious play is much slower to converge than the double
oracle algorithm.
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Figure 1: Convergence to the value of game G1
The utility function u2 in our second example (game G2)
is based on (Townsend 2014). Specifically,
u2(x, y) = − cos2((x− 0.1)y)− x sin(3x+ y)
is defined on X = [−2.25, 2.5] and Y = [−2.5, 1.75]; see
Figure 2. The convergence to the value is depicted on Fig-
ure 3. Once again the double oracle algorithm converges
fast, while fictitious play is rather slow to converge. In Fig-
ure 4 we show the optimal strategies of Player 1. The double
oracle algorithm converged to a mixed strategy supported
by four points, the fictitious play seems to reach in limit
a continuous distribution whose peaks are those points. Note
that the vertical axis is rescaled to account for the difference
between discrete and continuous distributions.
Figure 2: Townsend function u2
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Figure 3: Convergence to the value of game G2
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Figure 4: Mixed strategies in game G2
Colonel Blotto Game
We consider a continuous variant of the Colonel Blotto
game. Two players simultaneously allocate forces across n
battlefields. Both strategy spaces X and Y equal tox := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn | xj ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
xj = 1
 .
The utility function of Player 1,
u(x,y) :=
n∑
j=1
aj · l(xj − yj),
captures the total excess of the first army over the second
army. The result on a battlefield j is aj · l(xj − yj), where
aj > 0 is a weight of battlefield j and l(xj − yj) mea-
sures the performance of the first army on a battlefield j.
The standard choice is the signum function l(z) = sgn(z);
see (Gross and Wagner 1950) or (Roberson 2006). In this pa-
per we assume that each player must allocate a sufficiently
higher proportion of forces than the opponent to win the bat-
tle on a single battlefield. Namely, we consider
l(z) =

−1 if z ≤ −c,
1
c z if z ∈ [−c, c],
1 if z ≥ c,
for some c > 0. (8)
When c→ 0, we recover the classical infinite colonel Blotto
game since (8) approaches sgn(z) in the limit.
We will show how to compute best response strate-
gies in case of (8). Assume that Player 2 employs strate-
gies (y1, . . . ,yk) with probabilities (q1, . . . , qk), where
yi := (y
1
i , . . . , y
n
i ) ∈ Y . Then any best response strategy
of Player 1 is a solution to
max
x∈X
k∑
i=1
qi
n∑
j=1
aj · l(xj − yji ). (9)
Since l is a piecewise affine function, this nonlinear opti-
mization problem can be reformulated as a mixed-integer
linear problem. In Appendix C we derive its equivalent form
max
x,s,t,z,w
k∑
i=1
qi
n∑
j=1
aj (sij − tij − 1)
s.t. x ∈ X,
sij ≥ 0, sij ≥ 1c (xj − yji + c),
sij ≤ 1c (xj − yji + c) +Msl (1− zij),
sij ≤Msuzij ,
tij ≥ 0, tij ≥ 1c (xj − yji − c),
tij ≤ 1c (xj − yji − c) +M tl (1− wij),
tij ≤M tuwij ,
sij ∈ R, tij ∈ R, zij ∈ {0, 1}, wij ∈ {0, 1},
whereMsl = M
t
u =
1
c −1 andM tl = Msu = 1c +1. The best
response of Player 2 is obtained by solving an analogous
MILP. Note that the MILP defined above is necessarily dif-
ferent from the one formulated in (Ganzfried 2020).
For the numerical results we consider three battlefields
(n = 3) with equal weights (a = (1, 1, 1)). We observed
that the choice of initial strategy sets X1 and Y1 is crucial.
Indeed, setting
X1 = Y1 = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
provides much faster convergence than starting from a ran-
dom point. The reason lies in the left-hand side of Fig-
ure 5, which shows the optimal solution produced by the
double oracle algorithm for c = 132 . The optimal strategies
are equidistant on the grid with distance c. This is a sen-
sible result as the best response of Player 1 to the strategy
(y1, y2, y3) of Player 2 is (y1 + c, y2 + c, y3− 2c). Since X1
and Y1 already belong to the grid, all the iterates stay in it.
However, they may not converge within this set when initial
strategies are chosen at random.
The previous observation inspired us to start with both
X1 and Y1 as the whole grid. It turned out that the dou-
ble oracle converged in one iteration (the initial point was
already an equilibrium) to the strategies depicted in Figure
6. The left-hand side shows the results for c = 116 , while
the right-hand side corresponds to c = 132 . These results
are close to the hexagonal solutions obtained in (Gross and
Wagner 1950) and (Roberson 2006).
Figure 5: The optimal strategy for c = 132 when started from three corner points (left). The convergence of the double oracle
algorithm for n = 3 and n = 10 (scaled by 150 for demonstration purposes) battlefields (right).
Figure 6: The optimal strategies for c = 116 (left) and c =
1
32 (right) produced by the double oracle algorithm when started from
the grid. Both solutions are symmetric.
The right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the convergence of
the double oracle algorithm for n = 3 with a = (1, 1, 1)
and for n = 10 with a = (3, 4, . . . , 12). In both cases we
put c = 116 . It appears that the convergence is influenced
by c more than by the number of battlefields n.
5 Conclusions
We extended the double oracle algorithm from finite to
continuous games. We proved that the algorithm recovers
a finitely-supported -equilibrium in finitely many iterations
and converges to an equilibrium in a possibly infinite num-
ber of iterations. We showed that the double oracle algorithm
performs better than fictitious play on selected examples. It
is evident that the convergence of this algorithm depends
on the size of constructed subgames and the best response
calculation in each iteration. One of the open problems for
future research is to analyze the speed of convergence of
the double oracle algorithm.
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A Weak Convergence of Measures
We will summarize a necessary background in weak topol-
ogy on the space of probability measures (Billingsley 1968).
A sequence of mixed strategies (pi) in ∆X weakly converges
to p ∈ ∆X if
lim
i→∞
∫X f(x) dpi = ∫X f(x) dp
for every continuous function f : X → R, and we denote
this by pi ⇒ p. Endowed with the topology corresponding
to weak convergence, the convex set of mixed strategies ∆X
is a compact space. Analogously, ∆Y becomes a compact
set and so is the set ∆ = ∆X ×∆Y . Then the definition (1)
warrants that U is a continuous function on ∆. Note that
compactness of ∆ and continuity of U imply the existence
of all maximizers/minimizers throughout the paper.
Proposition A.1. The space ∆ is weakly sequentially com-
pact, that is, every sequence in ∆ contains a weakly conver-
gent subsequence.
Since U is continuous, the definition of weak convergence
immediately implies the following two statements:
• If pi ⇒ p in ∆X and qi ⇒ q in ∆Y , then
U(pi, qi)→ U(p, q). (10)
• If pi ⇒ p in ∆X and yi → y in Y , then
U(pi, yi)→ U(p, y). (11)
Finally, it can be shown that the optimal value of utility func-
tion in response to the opponent’s mixed strategy is attained
for some pure strategy.
Proposition A.2. For any p ∈ ∆X we have
min
y∈Y
U(p, y) = min
q∈∆Y
U(p, q).
B Proofs and Additional Results
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The existence of an -equilibrium
follows from Theorem 3.1. To prove the second part, assume
that (p∗, q∗) is an -equilibrium. Then (3) implies
max
p∈∆X
U(p, q∗)− ≤ U(p∗, q∗) ≤ min
q∈∆Y
U(p∗, q)+. (12)
Let (pˆ, qˆ) be an equilibrium of G. Then
U(pˆ, qˆ) ≤ U(pˆ, q∗) ≤ max
p∈∆X
U(p, q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q∗) + ,
where the first inequality follows from (2) and the third
from (12). In a similar way, we can show
U(pˆ, qˆ) ≥ U(p∗, qˆ) ≥ min
q∈∆Y
U(p∗, q) ≥ U(p∗, q∗)− .
Combining these two relations with U(pˆ, qˆ) = v(G) imply
the second statement of Proposition 2.2.
Lemma B.1. Assume Xi+1 = Xi and Yi+1 = Yi in some
step i of Algorithm 3.1. Then U(p∗i , yi+1) = U(xi+1, q
∗
i ).
Proof. The condition Xi+1 = Xi implies xi+1 ∈ Xi. Then
U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) = max
x∈Xi
U(x, q∗i ) = max
x∈X
U(x, q∗i ) = U(xi+1, q
∗
i ),
where the first equality follows from Proposition 2.1 applied
to the subgame (Xi, Yi, u), the second from xi+1 ∈ Xi, and
the third from the definition of iterate xi+1.
Similarly, we can show U(p∗i , q
∗
i ) = U(p
∗
i , yi+1), which
means U(p∗i , yi+1) = U(xi+1, q
∗
i ).
Lemma B.2. The inequality
vi ≤ v(G) ≤ vi
holds in every step i of Algorithm 3.1.
Proof. Let (p∗, q∗) be an equilibrium of G. Then
vi = U(p
∗
i , yi+1) = min
y∈Y
U(p∗i , y) = min
q∈∆Y
U(p∗i , q)
≤ U(p∗i , q∗) ≤ U(p∗, q∗) = v(G).
The second inequality can be obtained analogously.
Example B.1. DefineX := [0, 1], Y := [0, 1], and consider
an arbitrary continuous function u : X × Y → R for which
the double oracle algorithm produces an infinite number of
iterates (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . for  = 0. Further, put X˜ :=
[0, 1] ∪ [2, 3] and let u˜ : X˜ × Y → R be given by
u˜(x, y) =
{
u(x, y) if x ∈ [0, 1],
u(x− 2, y) if x ∈ [2, 3].
Since u is continuous, (X˜, Y, u˜) is a continuous game. Since
u˜(x, y) = u˜(x+2, y), the extrema of marginal functions are
not unique. Considering y˜i = yi, the double oracle algo-
rithm may produce the sequence of iterations
x˜i =
{
xi if i is odd,
xi + 2 if i is even.
This sequence is obviously not convergent. However, there
exists a convergent subsequence and its limit is an equilib-
rium by Theorem 3.1.
C Best Response for Colonel Blotto Game
Function l from (8) can be written as
l(z) = max
{
1
c (z + c), 0
}−max{ 1c (z − c), 0}− 1.
With each i, j in (9) we associate auxiliary variables sij
and tij and the contraints ensuring l(xj−yji ) = sij−tij−1.
The constraints on sij and tij follow from Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.1. Let a > 0, b ∈ R, Ml > 0, Mu > 0 and
f(x) := max{a(x−b), 0}. For every x such that a(x−b) ∈
[−Ml,Mu] there are a unique s ∈ R and a possibly non-
unique z ∈ {0, 1} solving the system
s ≥ 0, s ≤ a(x− b) +Ml(1− z),
s ≥ a(x− b), s ≤Muz.
Moreover, it holds f(x) = s.
Proof. The proof is based on the well-known big-M method
for the deactivation of constraints. The claim follows from
the following implications,
a(x− b) < 0 =⇒ z = 0 =⇒ s = 0,
a(x− b) > 0 =⇒ z = 1 =⇒ s = a(x− b).
If a(x − b) = 0, then s = 0 is unique, whereas z may have
either value.
Since xj , yji ∈ [0, 1], we have
1
c (x
j − yji + c) ∈ [− 1c + 1, 1c + 1],
1
c (x
j − yji − c) ∈ [− 1c − 1, 1c − 1],
which gives the bounds in Lemma C.1.
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